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Zoning and Land Use Law
by Newton M. Galloway*
and Steven L. Jones"
This year and volume, the sixty-ninth, mark the phoenix flight of the
Zoning and Land Use Law survey. The survey last appeared in the sixtyfirst volume' of the Mercer Law Review, just as the Great Recession was
taking its toll on real estate development. The Great Recession shifted
development activity away from constructing new buildings to protecting
the value of investment in existing structures from the ravages of the
landslide of foreclosures. At the height of the Great Recession, there was
virtually no demand for new residential or commercial construction, and
new construction and development ground to a halt. New commercial
developments sat vacant. Thousands of recently platted residential
subdivision lots were in foreclosure, with little or no chance of being
developed. 2
Local governments suffered huge revenue losses as income from
building permits and impact fees dwindled to almost nothing. Local
governments slashed their development and inspection personnel
because revenues (usually generated by permit and impact fees) were
insufficient to sustain them. Development-related businesses failed, and
their employees, consulting engineers, and subcontractors suffered dire
Partner in the firm of Galloway & Lyndall, LLP. Mercer University (B.A., 1978);
Mercer University School of Law (J.D., 1981); Member, Mercer Law Review (1979-1981).
Member, State Bar of Georgia.
-Associate in the firm of Galloway & Lyndall, LLP. University of Georgia (B.BA.,
2012); Mercer University School of Law (J.D., 2016). Member, Mercer Law Review (20142016). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. Dennis J. Webb Jr., et al., Zoning and Land Use Law, Annual Survey of Georgia
Law, 61 MERCER L. REV. 427 (2009).
2. See Henry County Council for Quality Growth, Henry County Permit Analysis:
2005-09 (May 8, 2009) (on file with Author) (showing a 90% decrease in Single Family
Building Permits issued in 2008 as compared to 2005); see also Dan Chapman, Boom Goes
Bust in Atlanta's Exurbs, AJC.coM (Sept. 7, 2010, 8:09 AM), http://www.ajc.com/business
/boom-goes-bust-atlanta-exurbs/HUJJamj8Ns9fdIrmwtLZO/.
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trickle-down economic consequences. With no new development, rezoning
applications and development permit applications were unnecessary.
Thus, there was no action to challenge. Except for foreclosure related
3
issues, no development related litigation ensued.
By late 2014, the Great Recession's damage was done. In certain
geographic locales (largely urban and affluent), real estate development
breathed new life. That trend continues today, and is evidenced by the
many construction cranes towering above new development sites in
Midtown Atlanta and Buckhead.
Though a large inventory of undeveloped property already approved
for development remains, the number of new development proposals that
require zoning review and approval is increasing almost everywhere.
With new rezoning and development permit applications increasing and
requiring more land use decisions, more judicial challenges are
inevitable. 4
As development ceased during the Great Recession, new justices and
judges were elected or appointed to Georgia's appellate benches. 5 Before
the Great Recession, it was difficult to get Georgia appellate courts to
accept a development-related case. An application for appeal, which the

3. See Henry County Council for Quality Growth, supra note 2 (showing a $4,361,437
decrease (-90%) in Impact Fee Revenue between 2005 and 2008).
4. Michael E. Kanell, Atlanta's Housing Market Rebounds from the Recession,
MYAJC.coM (Nov. 13, 2017, 1:31 PM), http://www.myajc.comlbusiness/atlanta-housingmarket-rebounds-from-the-recession/JUGMTdXSvVYcGtXyFRnpGJ/.
5. Between 2008 and 2017, three justices left and five justices were appointed to the
Georgia Supreme Court, and eleven judges left and fourteen judges were appointed to the
Georgia Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court of Georgia History, GEORGIA SUPREME
COURT, http://www.gasupreme.us/court-information/history (last visited Aug. 1, 2017);
Roster of Judges, GEORGIA COURT OF APPEALS, http://www.gaappeals.us/history/roster.php,
(last visited Aug. 1, 2017).
Of the Georgia Supreme Court, only three pre-recession justices, or about 33% of
the nine-member court remain. The Supreme Court of Georgia History, supra (listing Robert
Benham, 1990-1995 & 2001-present; Carol W. Hunstein, 1992-2009 & 2013-present;
Harold Melton, 2005-present).
The size of the Georgia Supreme Court increased in 2016 from seven to nine
justices. Ga. H.R. Bill 927, Reg. Sess., 2016 Ga. Laws 883, § 4-1 (codified as amended at
O.C.G.A. § 15-2-1.1 (2017)). Only four pre-recession judges, or roughly 25%, of the fifteenmember court remain on the court of appeals. Roster of Judges, supra(listing Gary Blaylock
Andrews, 1991-present; Anne Elizabeth Barnes, 1999-present; M. Yvette Miller, 1999present; John J. Ellington, 1999-present).
In 2015, the number of judges on the Georgia Court of Appeals increased from
twelve to fifteen members. Ga. H.R. Bill 279, Reg. Sess., 2015 Ga. Laws 919, § 1-2 (codified
at O.C.G.A. § 15-3-1(a) (2017)).
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court could grant (or not) in its discretion, was required, 6 irrespective of
statutes that specifically authorize a direct appeal. 7 Post-recession, new
development issues raised in new cases will be heard largely by new
justices and judges. 8 This combination provides the opportunity for
significant changes in Georgia's zoning and land use jurisprudence.
This Article reviews the first round of post-recession zoning and land
use decisions of the new justices on the Georgia Supreme Court and
judges on the Georgia Court of Appeals9 issued between June 1, 2015 and
May 31, 2017.10

6. O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a)(1) (1989) (requiring application to appeal "decisions of the
superior courts reviewing decisions of ... state and local administrative agencies"); Trend
Dev. Corp. v. Douglas Cty., 259 Ga. 425, 426, 383 S.E.2d 123, 124 (1989) (holding under
O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a)(1), "all zoning cases appealed either to the Court of Appeals or the
Supreme Court of Georgia must ... come by application.").
7. O.C.G.A. § 9-6-28 (2004); Kappelmeier v. Iannazzone, 279 Ga. 131, 131, 610 S.E.2d
60, 61 (2005).
8. After the start of the Great Recession, 66% of the Georgia Supreme Court was
appointed. See The Supreme Court of Georgia History, supra note 5. Roughly 75% of the
Georgia Court of Appeals was appointed after the start of the Great Recession. See Roster
of Judges, supranote 5.
9. As a survey of recent developments in Georgia zoning and land use law, this Article
does not include federal decisions. However, recent federal cases-(1) Murr v. Wisconsin,
137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017) (announcing a balancing factor test for regulatory taking claims); (2)
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015) (invalidating the town's sign ordinance
because it was content based on its face, and effectively doing the same for most sign
ordinances throughout the country); and (3) Buehrie v. City of Key West, 813 F.3d 973 (11th
Cir. 2015) (holding, in a case of first impression for the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit, that the physical act of tattooing is artistic expression protected by
the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and that the City of Key West's
strict limit on the number of tattoo parlors in its historic district could not survive
intermediate scrutiny)-are significant.
Reed will be reviewed in a special contribution for the Eleventh Circuit Survey
which will appear in Volume 69, Number 4 of the Mercer Law Review. Newton M. Galloway
& Steven L. Jones, Eleventh Circuit Survey, 69 MERCER L. REV. (forthcoming Summer
2018).
10. This Article does not review cases involving condemnation, nuisance, trespass,
easement, or restrictive covenant cases. Additionally, this survey will not address recent
annexation decisions decided just outside of the survey period. See, e.g., City of Atlanta v.
Mays, 301 Ga. 367, 801 S.E.2d 1 (2017).
The Authors were unable to cover every interesting planning and zoning case; some
additional recommended cases are as follows: (1) Southern States-Bartow Cty., Inc. v.
Riverwood Farms Homeowners Ass'n, 300 Ga. 609, 797 S.E.2d 468 (2017) (holding that a
county's zoning ordinance requiring vested rights for non-conforming uses to be exercised
within one year of an ordinance adoption was unconstitutional as applied to a property
owner who acquired vested rights before the enactment of the new zoning code-which
contained the reversion clause-but after the previous zoning code was invalidated by the
court because the reversion clause operated as a retrospective law which injuriously
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I. ZONING APPEALS-THE LOCAL ORDINANCE APPEAL PROCEDURE
DOES NOT MATTER1

In City of Cumming v. Flowers,12 the Georgia Supreme Court
addressed the appropriate procedure to challenge an unfavorable zoning
or land use decision by a local government. 18 Though the court intended
to implement a bright line rule setting the procedure to challenge a local
government land use decision, Cumming actually raises as many
questions as it answers. If applied broadly, Cumming is a very significant
change in land use law.
In Cumming, the Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA) for the City of
Cumming (the City) granted a developer a variance in accordance with
the procedure required by the City's zoning ordinance. Neighboring
homeowners filed a complaint in Forsyth County Superior Court
challenging approval of the variance, seeking a writ of mandamus and
injunctive relief against the City, the Mayor, the individual members of
the City Council, and the "City Council and/or Members of the Board of
Zoning Appeals"1 4 (collectively, the City) and the developer. The City
moved to dismiss the complaint. The motion to dismiss was treated as a
motion for summary judgment to permit the trial court to consider City
ordinances governing zoning appeals that were attached to the motion.
The City argued that BZA's decision granting the variance was a "quasijudicial" act, which could only be judicially reviewed pursuant to a writ

affected the vested rights of a citizen in violation of article I, section 1, paragraph 10 of the
Constitution of the State of Georgia); (2) Oasis Goodtime Emporium I, Inc. v. City of
Doraville, 297 Ga. 513, 773 S.E.2d 728 (2015) (holding that a city's sexually-oriented
business ordinance was content-neutral, and under intermediate scrutiny did not
unconstitutionally infringe on the Freedom of Speech); and (3) Hoechstetter v. Pickens Cty.,
341 Ga. App. 213, 799 S.E.2d 352 (2017) (holding that under the notice provision of the
Zoning Procedures Law, O.C.G.A. § 36-66-4(a) (2017), a notice is not required at every stage
of "the 'entire process"' of a "zoning decision;" it only has to be given once during the
"continuous course of a zoning matter").
11. Just outside the survey period, the Georgia Supreme Court decided the following
cases related to zoning appeals: (1) Lathrop v. Deal, 301 Ga. 408, 801 S.E.2d 867 (2017)
(holding that sovereign immunity bars declaratory and injunctive relief against the state,
its departments and agencies, and public officials in their official capacities for allegedly
unconstitutional official acts) and (2) Schumacher v. City of Roswell, 301 Ga. 635, 803
S.E.2d 66 (2017) (holding that, although "zoning case[s]" require an application for
discretionary appeal under O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a)(1), a constitutional facial challenge to an
ordinance is not a "zoning case" and, therefore, can proceed to Georgia's appellate courts
via direct appeal).
12. 300 Ga. 820, 797 S.E.2d 846 (2017).

13. See id.
14. Id. at 820, 797 S.E.2d at 849.
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of certiorari.1 5 The court agreed, but its opinion goes beyond the appeal
of the variance that was requested.16
. The Georgia Constitution authorizes local governments to adopt plans
and exercise the power of zoning.1 7 When a local government exercises
its zoning power, its governing body is sitting as the local government's
legislature performing a legislative, not judicial, act.18 The enactment of
a zoning ordinance is legislative.19 The approval of a rezoning
application, which amends the zoning ordinance and the zoning map with
respect to a specific parcel, is also legislative. 20
In fact, Georgia Zoning Procedures Law (the ZPL)21 specifically
identifies five actions that constitute "zoning decisions" which are (by
definition) legislative acts:
The adoption of a zoning ordinance;
The adoption of an amendment to a zoning ordinance which changes
the text of the zoning ordinance;

15. Id. at 820-22, 797 S.E.2d at 49.
O.C.G.A. § 5-4-5 provides as follows:
(a) Before any writ of certiorari shall issue, except as provided in subsection (c)
of this Code section, the party applying for the same, his agent, or his attorney
shall give bond and good security, conditioned to pay the adverse party in the
case the sums sought as an award to be recovered, together with all future costs,
and shall also produce a certificate from the officer whose decision or judgment
is the subject matter of complaint that all costs which may have accrued on the
trial below have been paid. The bond and certificate shall be filed with the
petition for certiorari, and security on the bond shall be liable as securities on
appeal.
(b) The person authorized to receive bond and security may compel the security
tendered to swear upon oath the means by which he can fulfill the bond
obligation. Such action shall exonerate from liability the person receiving the
bond and security.
(c) If the party applying for the writ of certiorari makes and files with his petition
a written affidavit that he is advised and believes that he has good cause for
certiorari to the superior court and that because of his indigence he is unable to
pay the costs or give security, as the case may be, the affidavit shall in every
respect answer instead of the certificate and bond above-mentioned.
O.C.G.A. § 5-4-5 (2017).
16. See Cumming, 300 Ga. at 820-22, 797 S.E.2d at 49.
17. GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. 4.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 21-22.
19. O.C.G.A. § 36-66-3(4)(A) (2017); RCG Props., LLC v. City of Atlanta Bd. of Zoning
Adjustment, 260 Ga. App. 355, 361, 579 S.E.2d 782, 786 (2003) (quoting O.C.G.A. § 36-663(4) and Bentley v. Chastain, 242 Ga. 348, 349 n.3, 249 S.E.2d 38, 39 n.3 (1978)).
20. O.C.G.A. § 36-66-3(4)(C) (2017).
21. O.C.G.A. §§ 36-66-1-6 (2017).
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The adoption of an amendment to a zoning ordinance which rezones
property from one zoning classification to another;
The adoption of an amendment to a zoning ordinance by a municipal
local government which zones property to be annexed into the
municipality; or
The grant of a permit relating to a special use of property. 22
The local government must follow procedures set forth in the ZPL
under section 36-66-423 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated
(O.C.G.A.) as it considers each of these five legislative zoning decisions. 24
Local governments cannot delegate zoning power, 25 and an inferior board
cannot make a zoning decision. 26
In contrast, approval of a variance does not amend the local
government's zoning ordinance, and it is not a legislative act. 27 A
variance application does not seek rezoning, nor does approval change
the land uses permitted within the zoning district. 28 The variance
application asserts that strict application (usually of zoning district
development criteria, such as lot width, road frontage, and setbacks)
causes a hardship to property's reasonable economic development. 29 The
variance application asks the local government to modify the zoning
district's development requirements in a very limited case, specific only
to the parcel identified in the variance application.3 0 Since a variance is
not a zoning decision, the local government may delegate authority to
approve a variance to an inferior board, such as a Board of Zoning
Appeals, as in Cumming.31 The variance applicant must prove that
compliance with the zoning district's development criteria imposes a
hardship on the property. 32 The variance application is reviewed in light

22. O.C.G.A. § 36-66-3(4) (2017).
23. O.C.G.A. § 36-66-4 (2017).
24. Id.
25. E.g., Button Gwinnett Landfill, Inc. v. Gwinnett Cty., 256 Ga. 818, 820, 353 S.E.2d
328, 330 (1987).
26. See id. at 819, 353 S.E.2d at 330 (quoting Humthlett v. Reeves, 212 Ga. 8, 13, 90
S.E.2d 14, 18 (1955)).
27. See Cumming, 300 Ga. App. at 823, 797 S.E.2d at 850; RCG Props., 260 Ga. App.
at 361, 579 S.E.2d at 787.
28.

ARDEN H. RATHKOPF ET AL., 3 RATHKOPF'S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING

58:1 (4th ed. 2015).
29. Id.

30. See id.
31. Id.
32. Id.

§
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of criteria set forth in the zoning ordinance for variance approval. 33
Therefore, consideration of a variance application is a quasi-judicial, not
legislative act.34
Historically, the zoning ordinance sets forth the procedures and time
limits for filing a challenge to a land use decision. It has long been
accepted procedure to challenge a land use decision by following the
procedures set forth in the zoning ordinance. 35 Appeal directives in a
zoning ordinance generally state that an aggrieved party may appeal a
final action to the county superior court within thirty days of the date on
which the action was taken. 36
In the early 1990s, some zoning ordinances were amended to require
that challenges to some land use decisions proceed to superior court by
writ of certiorari. 37 The writ process was usually applied to challenge a
variance decision. Text requiring appeal by writ of certiorari usually
stated:
The decision of the Board of Zoning Appeals is a final decision;
therefore, any appeal of such a decision shall be pursued by application
for writ of certiorari filed with the Superior Court of Fulton County
within 30 days of the date of the decision. 38

Writ procedures were immediately challenged when first introduced.
In Jackson v. Spalding County,39 the Georgia Supreme Court upheld the
provision of a zoning ordinance that required a challenge to the denial of
a variance to proceed by writ of certiorari.4 0 The court affirmed that the
local government had the authority to set forth the method of appeal in
its zoning ordinance. 41
The remedy sought when challenging a land use decision also impacts
the procedure used. Very often, a land use decision challenge will include

33. Id.
34. See, e.g., Cumming, 300 Ga. at 820, 797 S.E.2d at 848; RCG Props., 260 Ga. App.
at 361, 579 S.E.2d at 787; Button Gwinnett Landfill, Inc., 256 Ga. at 819, 353 S.E.2d at 330.
35. See Cumming, 300 Ga. at 822-23, 797 S.E.2d at 850 (discussing the local ordinance
requirements).
36. E.g., SPALDING COUNTY, CODE OF ORDINANCES app. IV (the Zoning Ordinance) §
418 & app. C.
37. See Cumming, 300 Ga. at 822, 797 S.E.2d at 850; Shockley v. Fayette Cty., 260 Ga.
489, 490-91, 396 S.E.2d 883, 884 (1990); Jackson v. Spalding Cty., 265 Ga. 792, 792, 462
S.E.2d 361, 362 (1995).
38. E.g., FULTON COUNTY, CODE OF ORDINANCES pt. II, app. B, art. 22, § 22.13.
39. 265 Ga. 792, 462 S.E.2d 361 (1995), overruled by Cumming, 300 Ga. at 820, 797
S.E.2d at 848 (stating "We disapprove of cases ... the leading one being Jackson.").
40. Jackson, 265 Ga. at 793, 462 S.E.2d at 362-63.
41. Id. at 795, 462 S.E.2d at 364-65.
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a petition for a writ of mandamus. Mandamus is appropriate when an
official duty has not been "faithfully performed." 42 A mandamus is often
linked to a land use challenge because a permit application has been
tendered (and probably denied) for a land use that the property owner
contends is authorized as a matter of right. Mandamus is a remedy if a
building official has wrongfully denied a permit for a use that is
permitted in the zoning district. 43 As a litigation strategy, a rezoning
application may be accompanied with a development permit application
to test its denial by the building official. Mandamus would not be
available in a variance or special use permit because the applicant has
no clear legal right to the permit. 44 However, the mandamus action is
totally separate and independent from an action challenging rezoning
denial, even though it may arise from the same set of facts. 45
With this background, the significance of Cumming is apparent. The
Georgia Supreme Court overruled Jackson in Cumming.46 However, the
scope of the decision in Cumming is problematic. Did the decision
narrowly hold that the proper way to challenge a variance decision is only
by writ of certiorari when no method is set forth in the zoning ordinance?
Or did Cumming go much further and broadly eliminate the legality of
(what the court dubbed) the "local-ordinance requirement"-in other
words, that a zoning ordinance sets forth the procedures by which all
local government land use decisions, including zoning decisions, may be
appealed?
If the court's decision in Cumming is narrowly applied, it was
unnecessary for the court to overrule Jackson. Jackson is the leading case
holding that a variance decision was quasi-judicial and should therefore
be appealed by means of writ of certiorari pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 5-4-147
if that method was directed by the zoning ordinance.48 The court in

42. O.C.G.A. § 9-6-20 (2017).
43. E.g., DeKalb Cty. v. Publix Super Mkts., Inc., 264 Ga. 739, 741, 452 S.E.2d 471,
472 (1994).
44. See, e.g., Riley v. S. LNG, Inc., 300 Ga. 689, 691, 797 S.E.2d 878, 880-81 (2017).
45. See id.
46. The first cases that announced the local-ordinance requirement involved a special
use permit, not a zoning variance. City of Atlanta v. Wansley Moving & Storage Co., 245
Ga. 794, 795, 267 S.E.2d 234, 235-36 (1980) (stating "Judicial review of the denial of
conditional use permits has traditionally been by way of mandamus . ..We find no reason
to treat special use permits differently from conditional use permits insofar as the means
of judicial review is concerned."). However, other cases also decided before Jackson
involving a zoning variance came to the same conclusion: the local-ordinance requirement
controls. E.g., Shockley, 260 Ga. at 490-91, 396 S.E.2d at 884.
47. O.C.G.A. § 5-4-1 (2017).
48. Jackson, 265 Ga. at 793, 462 S.E.2d at 363.
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Jackson also stated that a variance decision may be appealed by writ of
mandamus "[w]hen the zoning ordinance fails to prescribe a method of

judicial

review." 4 9

In both Cumming and Jackson the court found that the City's decision
to approve the variance was quasi-judicial.5 0 In fact, the City's ordinance
characterized variance decisions as "administrative or quasi-judicial,"
and directed BZA to do the following: (1) "consider whether the facts
applying to a specific piece of property warrant relief from zoning under
the standards set in the [local] ordinance;"' (2) "'determine[] the facts and
appl[y] the ordinance's legal standards to them,' which is a 'decisionmaking process.. . akin to a judicial act;"' (3) "hold a hearing that is open
to the public;" (4) give notice of the hearing to the aggrieved party; and
(5) "inform all parties of its decision in writing within a reasonable
52
time." 5 1 In fact, BZA took public comment at both variance hearings.
The courts in both Jackson and Cumming held that a variance decision
is quasi-judicial and properly challenged by writ of certiorari to the
superior court pursuant to O.C.G.A § 5-4-1.53
If Cumming reached the same conclusion as Jackson, why does it
represent such a significant change in zoning law? The reason is the court
implemented a new rule governing land use decisions holding that a
zoning ordinance cannot direct the method of the challenge. 54 The court
rejected the local-ordinance requirement regardless of whether the local
ordinance provided for challenge by means of writ of certiorari.5 5 To
support its rejection of the local-ordinance requirement, the court, as in
Jackson, first had to analyze whether a variance decision is a quasijudicial decision.5 6 This analysis was required because it has long been
held that a writ of certiorari is not an available remedy for review of a
decision of an inferior judiciary or body "rendered in the exercise of
legislative, executive, or ministerial functions."57 In Cumming, the court
acknowledged the precedent that if the City's action were not quasi-

49. Id.
50. Id. at 794, 462 S.E.2d at 363-64; Cumming, 300 Ga. at 823, 797 S.E.2d at 850.
51. Cumming, 300 Ga. at 823-25, 797 S.E.2d at 850-52 (alterations in original)
(quoting Jackson, 265 Ga. at 793-94, 462 S.E.2d at 363-64).
52. Id. at 821, 797 S.E.2d at 849.
53. Id. at 822, 797 S.E.2d at 850; Jackson, 265 Ga. at 793-94, 462 S.E.2d at 363.
54. Cumming, 300 Ga. at 826, 797 S.E.2d at 852.
55. Id. at 822, 797 S.E.2d at 850.
56. Id. at 823, 797 S.E.2d at 850.
57. Id. (quoting Presnell v. McCollum, 112 Ga. App. 579, 579, 145 S.E.2d 770, 770
(1965)).
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judicial, Jackson would not apply, and a petition for certiorari could,
therefore, not be used to challenge the variance decision.5 8
However, the court in Cumming went further to hold that the localordinance requirement is invalid even if it directed a challenge to a quasijudicial land use decision to proceed by writ of certiorari.5 9 The court
stated:
The most troubling consequence of the local-ordinance requirement is
that it allows local ordinances to effectively preempt the general
certiorari statute. According to Jackson, the local ordinance rather
than O.C.G.A. § 5-4-1 determines how a variance decision must be
appealed; in fact, a city or county may turn the state statute off or on

simply by amending its ordinance. This scheme does not comport with
our Constitution, under which general laws are supreme over local
ordinances, including in the field of zoning.60
Ultimately, the court totally rejected the local-ordinance requirement,
and went to great lengths to demonstrate its rejection was right and
logical.61
The court analyzed whether the following factors of stare decisis
supported rejection of the local-ordinance requirement: (1) the soundness
of the precedent's reasoning; (2) the age of the precedent; (3) the reliance
the precedent has induced; and (4) the precedent's workability. 62 The
majority of the court's analysis focused on the age of the precedent.
Finding that the local-ordinance requirement conflicts with O.C.G.A § 54-1, as well as other precedents thereunder in non-zoning related cases, 63
the court noted that the Georgia Code has contained a statute analogous
to O.C.G.A. § 5-4-1 since 1860, allowing appeals of judicial and quasijudicial decisions of local governments to be brought by writ of
certiorari.6 4 The court reasoned that the local-ordinance requirement
gave "no justification for creating an exception." 65
Next, the court noted that when Jackson was decided, there was
uncertainty regarding whether a variance decision constituted "a
decision 'by [an] inferior judiciary or [a] person exercising judicial

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
S.E.2d
63.
64.
65.

Id.
Id. at 832-33, 797 S.E.2d at 856.
Id. at 829, 797 S.E.2d at 854.
Id. at 826-32, 797 S.E.2d at 852-56.
Id. at 826, 797 S.E.2d at 852, 856 (quoting Woodard v. State, 296 Ga. 803, 812, 771
362, 369 (2015)).
Id. at 826, 797 S.E.2d at 852.
Id. at 826-27, 797 S.E.2d at 852.
Id. at 827, 797 S.E.2d at 853.
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powers."' 6 6 The court noted its own conflicting precedent, sometimes

holding that mandamus was the proper way to challenge a variance and
conditional or special use permit decision without considering whether
the decision was quasi-judicial or if certiorari was also available, 67 and
other times holding that certiorari was not available because the
underlying decision was not quasi-judicial or judicial.66 The court noted
that one decision held that a decision on a conditional use permit could
be appealed via a writ of certiorari, 6 9 and another "suggested that
variance decisions may be quasi-judicial."70 While later cases such as
Dougherty County v. Webb 71 found that some zoning decisions were quasijudicial, they continued to endorse the local-ordinance requirement. 72
The court in Cumming said that the decision in Jackson "eliminated the
uncertainty that had generated the local-ordinance requirement, [but] it
preserved the requirement without explanation and apparently without
recognizing the inconsistency."73 For that reason, the court refused to
"perpetuate that analytical error." 74

The court's biggest grievance with the local-ordinance requirement
was "that it allow[ed] local ordinances to effectively preempt" O.C.G.A. §
5-4-1.75 Thus, it held that the local-ordinance requirement violates
constitutional notions of preemption under which local ordinances must
succumb to general statutes. 76 The court stated that it had already taken
66. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting O.C.G.A. § 5-4-1).
67. Id. at 827-28, 797 S.E.2d at 853 (citing Wansley Moving & Storage Co., 245 Ga. at
795, 267 S.E.2d at 235 (holding that a special use permit decision was a judicial decision);
and then citing Pruitt v. Meeks, 226 Ga. 661, 662, 177 S.E.2d 41, 43 (1970) (holding the
same for a conditional use permit)).
68. Id. (citing Int'l Funeral Servs., Inc. v. Dekalb Cty., 244 Ga. 707, 709, 261 S.E.2d
625, 627-28 (1979) (holding that a variance decision was "not a [quasi-]judicial" decision);
and then citing Manning v. A.A.B. Corp., 223 Ga. 111, 115, 153 S.E.3d 561, 564-65 (1967)
(holding same for a conditional use permit)).
69. Id. at 828, 797 S.E.2d at 853 (citing Jackson, 265 Ga. at 793-94, 462 S.E.2d at 363).
70. Id. (citing Bentley, 242 Ga. at 348 n.4, 249 S.E.2d at 39 n.4).
71. 256 Ga. 474, 350 S.E.2d 457 (1986), overruled by Cumming, 300 Ga. at 831, 797
S.E.2d at 855 (stating "We now formally disapprove of Webb.").
72. Cumming, 300 Ga. at 828-29, 797 S.E.2d at 854 (citing Wansley Moving & Storage
Co., 245 Ga. at 795, 267 S.E.2d at 235 (holding that a special use permit decision was a
judicial decision); and then citing Pruitt, 226 Ga. at 662, 177 S.E.2d at 43 (holding the same
for a conditional use permit)).
73. Id. at 829, 797 S.E.2d at 854.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 828-29 n.7, 797 S.E.2d at 853-54 n.7 (citing GA. CONST. art. HI, § 7, para.
4(a) (providing "Laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation throughout this
state and no local or special law shall be enacted in any case for which provision has been
made by an existing general law, except that the General Assembly may by general law
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steps to correct the local-ordinance requirement by preventing a local
government from creating a mechanism for a judicial appeal of its land
use decisions, including a direct appeal.77 Noting that Jackson was only
twenty-one years old and was only cited "a handful of times" (without any
additional supporting rationale), the age of the precedent posed no
barrier to its rejection because it was "neither ancient nor entrenched."7 8
Even though Jackson set precedent governing land use decision
challenges, rejection of the local-ordinance requirement amounted to an
'issue

. . . of appellate procedure, not contract, property, or other

substantive rights in which anyone has a significant reliance interest."' 79
The court acknowledged that its decision in Cumming would result in
dismissal of the neighbors' appeal with the consolation that it was not
aware of any other pending appeals that would be dismissed, and that a
pending appeal would only be dismissed if the following conditions were
met: (1) it was brought by writ of mandamus rather than by writ of
certiorari; (2) appealed from a quasi-judicial zoning decision; and (3)
certiorari was not provided for by the local ordinance.80 While the court
found that the local-ordinance requirement "is not unworkable, it is not
as workable as the correct rule"81 because it is difficult to determine
whether an ordinance provides for a writ of certiorari and what

authorize local governments by local ordinance or resolution to exercise police powers which
do not conflict with general laws."); then citing GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. 1(a) (providing
"The governing authority of each county shall have legislative power to adopt clearly
reasonable ordinances, resolutions, or regulations relating to its property, affairs, and local
government for which no provision has been made by general law and which is not
inconsistent with this Constitution or any local law applicable thereto."); then citing GA.
CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. 4 (providing "The governing authority of each county and of each
municipality may adopt plans and may exercise the power of zoning. This authorization
shall not prohibit the General Assembly from enacting general laws establishing
procedures for the exercise of such power.")).
77. Id. at 830-31, 797 S.E.2d at 855 (quoting Haralson Cty. v. Taylor Junkyard of
Bremen, Inc., 291 Ga. 321, 323, 729 S.E.2d 357, 359 (2012); Walton Cty. v. Scenic Hills
Estates, Inc., 261 Ga. 94, 94, 401 S.E.2d 513, 514 (1991)). To eliminate confusion in the
jurisprudence, the court explicitly declared that it overruled all prior cases holding that a
local government could provide for a direct appeal by ordinance. Id.
78. Id. at 831-32, 797 S.E.2d at 856 (quoting Southall v. State, 300 Ga. 462, 468, 796
S.E.2d 261, 267 (2017) (overruling forty-five-year-old precedent)).
79. Id. at 832, 797 S.E.2d at 856 (quoting Southall, 300 Ga. at 467, 796 S.E.2d at 267).
80. Id. at 832-33 n.8, 797 S.E.2d at 856 n.8.
81. Id. at 833, 797 S.E.2d at 856.

2017]

ZONING & LAND USE LAW

383

constitutes a quasi-judicial decision.82 The local-ordinance requirement,
consequently, could "pollute other streams of our law."83
Ultimately, the court used Cumming as the mechanism to void the
local-ordinance requirement, declaring that "[b]ecause the localordinance requirement's 'reasoning is unsound and contrary to the body
of our law,' the most important stare decisis factor weighs strongly in
favor of disapproving the requirement." 84 In doing so, the court in
Cumming made a significant new legal declaration regarding the
procedure by which a challenge to a local government land use decision
may be brought. After Cumming, the court stated that the appellate
procedure for future appeals is now clear. 85 However, the decision in
Cumming goes far beyond setting a procedure to challenge a local
government's quasi-judicial land use decision, such as a variance, and its
impact is far from clear.88
The most significant question raised by Cumming is whether its
elimination of the local-ordinance requirement applies to legislative
zoning decisions made by local governments, as well as quasi-judicial
decisions, like variances. While Cumming acknowledges that certiorari
is not an appropriate remedy to review a local government decision
rendered in the exercise of legislative functions, its text suggests it
applies broadly to zoning decisions as well.87 In fact, some of the cases on
which it relies involve zoning decisions-Hollberg v. Spalding County,88
Beugnot v. Coweta County,89 and Walton County v. Scenic Hills Estates,

82. Id. at 833, 797 S.E.2d at 856-57 (quoting section 113-120 of the City of Cumming's
Zoning Ordinance which provides, "All decisions of the mayor and council or the board of
zoning appeals are final and may be subject to appeal only by suit filed in the superior court
of the county. In cases of legislative decisions (e.g., rezonings, conditional use permits, and
text amendments), the review shall be de novo review. In cases of administrative or quasijudicial decisions (e.g., variances), review shall be based upon the existing record."). In fact,
the parties in Cumming fiercely argued over whether this section of Cumming's Zoning
Ordinance authorizes judicial review by writ of certiorari. Id. at 833, 797 S.E.2d at 857. The
court, however, did not analyze Sections 113-120 because it was moot. Id. at 833 n.9, 797
S.E.2d at 857 n,9 (stating "[g]iven our conclusion, we need not delve into which party is
right on this point.").
83. Id. at 834, 797 S.E.2d at 857 (quoting State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646, 647, 697 S.E.2d
757, 758 (2010)).
84. Id. at 831, 797 S.E.2d at 852, 856 (quoting State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. at 658, 697
S.E.2d at 766).
85. Id. at 832-33, 797 S.E.2d at 856.
86. See id. at 832, 797 S.E.2d at 855.
87. See id. at 830, 797 S.E.2d at 855.
88. 281 Ga. App. 768, 637 S.E.2d 163 (2006).
89. 231 Ga. App. 715, 500 S.E.2d 28 (1998).
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Inc.90 all involve rezoning actions. The court also quoted Stendahl v. Cobb
County91 for the proposition that "the General Assembly has not provided
a statutory mechanism for the direct appeal to superior court of the
zoning decisions of local governing authorities." 92
Additionally, the court did not even mention the definitions of "zoning
decisions" in the Cumming opinion. 93 Under the ZPL, 9 4 the State has
95
identified five "zoning decisions" that are "final legislative action[s]."
The State deemed each of these five zoning decisions to be legislative
actions by statute, to which the holding in Cumming should have no
application. However, Cumming states (without limitation) "[i]n short,
the local ordinance's control over the procedures that apply to the case
96
ends when the case leaves the local government for the superior court."
This certainly suggests that the court intended for the elimination of the
local-ordinance requirement in Cumming to apply to more land use
decisions than variances.97
The application of Cumming to a special use permit zoning decision is
the most contradictory part of the holding. Arguably, "[t]he grant of .a
permit relating to a special use of property" 98 is the hybrid in the ZPL's
definition of a zoning decision, and it is the most difficult to reconcile with
Cumming. A permit relating to a special use of property99 (in other words,
a special use permit, a special exception, or a conditional use permit),
looks quasi-judicial, like a variance. 0 0 But, a special use permit is a
zoning decision under the ZPL. 101 The court in Cumming did not mention
the ZPL when it stated the following in a footnote:
Special and conditional use permits "involve a special use authorized
by the existing zoning ordinance (e.g., airports, cemeteries, drive-in
theaters, mobile home and trailer parks, quarries) but the ordinance
provides that such uses shall be allowed only upon the condition that

90. 261 Ga. 94, 401 S.E.2d 513 (1991).
91. 284 Ga. 525, 668 S.E.2d 723 (2008).
92. Cumming, 300 Ga. at 831, 797 S.E.2d at 855 (emphasis added) (quoting Stendahl,
284 Ga. at 526, 668 S.E.2d at 726).
93. See Cumming, 300 Ga. 820, 797 S.E.2d 846.
94. See supra text accompanying notes 21-22.
95. O.C.G.A. § 36-66-3 (2017) (emphasis added).
96. Cumming, 300 Ga. at 831, 797 S.E.2d at 856.
97. See generally id.
98. O.C.G.A. § 36-66-3(4)(E) (2017).
99. Id.
100. RATHKOPF, supra note 28, § 58:3.
101. O.C.G.A. § 36-66-3(4)(E).
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102
Variance
it be approved by the appropriate governmental body."
requests are similar, except that the nonconforming use requested is
not explicitly provided for in the zoning ordinance, and the zoning
authority must "consider[] whether the facts applying to a specific
piece of property warrant relief from zoning under the standards set
103
in the county ordinance."

In the same footnote, the court stated,
[a]lthough the City and [the developer] point to this distinction as a
reason to abandon the local-ordinance requirement, it is not clear that
conditional and special use permit cases are meaningfully different
from variance cases in this context, at least in cases where the zoning
board must apply a set of factors set out in the zoning ordinance to the
104
specific facts of the conditional or special use request.
If (in the court's view) there is no meaningful difference between a
variance and a special use permit, the holding in Cumming that
eliminates the local-ordinance requirement and governs the required
procedure for a land use decision challenge would apply to a special use
permit-even though the ZPL designates a special use permit as a
legislative act. This renders Cumming inherently self-contradictory. If
Cumming applies to all land use challenges, legislative zoning decisions
as well as quasi-judicial variances, either the court or the Georgia
General Assembly will have to reconcile Cumming with the ZPL.105 Most
likely, the court will soon confront a factual scenario in which a lower
court applies Cumming to a rezoning or other legislative zoning decision
listed in the ZPL and the losing party appeals.
As it now stands, the ZPL and Cumming are in direct conflict unless
the holding in Cumming is expressly limited to a variance challenge.
However, the conflict (or possibly more-appropriately describedconfusion) existed even before Cumming. The Georgia Court of Appeals
10
decided Bulloch County Board of Commissioners v. Williams 6 during
under
sought
the survey period and held that when "a special permit is
in a
'acts
body
terms set out in the local ordinance, the local governing
10 7
but
the
law,"'
quasi-judicial capacity to determine the facts and apply

&

102. Cumming, 300 Ga. at 828 n.5, 797 S.E.2d at 853 n.5 (quoting Wansley Moving
Storage Co., 245 Ga. at 794, 267 S.E.2d at 234).
103. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Jackson, 265 Ga. at 793, 432 S.E.2d at 361).
104. Id.
105. See supra text accompanying notes 21-22.
106. 332 Ga. App. 815, 773 S.E.2d 37 (2015).
107. Id. at 817, 773 S.E.2d at 39 (quoting Webb, 256 Ga. at 478 n.3, 350 S.E.2d at 460
n.3).
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made no reference to the designation of a special use permit as a zoning
decision under the ZPL. 108
The Cumming decision creates a number of pitfalls for practitioners.
While Cumming makes it clear that a land use challenge involving a
variance must proceed by writ of certiorari, no other challenge procedure
is clear. 109 Counsel for a party challenging a land use decision must
decide how Cumming applies, if it does. The problem is obvious: if the
land use challenge does not follow correct procedure, it will be dismissed
long after the time for pursuing an alternative challenge process has
passed. Will Cumming require prudent counsel to file both a direct
appeal and a writ of certiorari when in doubt of application of the local
government's ordinance and irrespective of whether the land use is a
legislative zoning decision under ZPL? 110 Must land use practitioners
now become versed in writs of certiorari and related procedures, such as
O.C.G.A. § 5-4-3111 which sets the procedural requirements for filing a
writ of certiorari? Specifically, O.C.G.A. § 5-4-3 provides as follows:
When either party in any case in any inferior judicatory or before any
person exercising judicial powers is dissatisfied with the decision or
judgment in the case, the party may apply for and obtain a writ of
certiorari by petition to the superior court for the county in which the
case was tried, in which petition he shall plainly and distinctly set
forth the errors complained of. On the filing of the petition in the office
of the clerk of the superior court, with the sanction of the appropriate
judge endorsed thereon, together with the bond or affidavit, as
provided in OCGA § 5-4-5, it shall be the duty of the clerk to issue a
writ of certiorari, directed to the tribunal or person whose decision or
judgment is the subject matter of complaint, requiring the tribunal or
person to certify and send up all the proceedings in the case to the

superior court, as directed in the writ of certiorari. 112

Even if a writ of mandamus is the appropriate remedy to challenge the
wrongful denial of a permit, must the challenge proceed by writ of
certiorari because of the permit's connection and nexus to a zoning
decision? The reality is that no one, including the court in Cumming,
knows. It will take litigants several years and the financial wherewithal

108. See Williams, 332 Ga. App. at 815, 773 S.E.2d at 37.
109. See Cumming, 300 Ga. at 820, 797 S.E.2d at 848.
110. A related issue arose just outside the survey period in Schumacher regarding
appeals from a trial courts' decisions on zoning related matters. Schumacher, 301 Ga. 635,
803 S.E.2d 66.
111. O.C.G.A. § 5-4-3 (2017).
112. Id.
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to flesh out the extent of the holding of Cumming. The path forward for
local government and land use attorneys is certainly unclear.

After Cumming, City of Dunwoody v. Discovery PracticeManagement,
Inc., 113 has new implications. Decided before Cumming, Discovery held
that the renewal provision of O.C.G.A § 9-2-61(a) 114 applies to writ of
certiorari cases. 115 In Dunwoody, the city planner for the City of
Dunwoody (the City) issued a letter to Discovery Practice Management,
Inc. (Discovery) that classified Discovery's proposed use of the subject
property as a "family personal care home" and stated that it was
permitted as a matter of right in the zoning district applicable to the
subject property. Three months later, neighbors of the subject property
filed an "application for administrative appeal" with the City's Zoning
Board of Appeals (the ZBA), though the City's zoning ordinance required
an appeal to be filed in thirty days. 116 The ZBA accepted the appeal and
held hearings thereon. Agreeing with the neighbors, the ZBA concluded
that Discovery's intended use constituted a "medical treatment facility,"
a use not permitted in the zoning district. The ZBA also found, at the
neighbors' insistence, that the City's zoning ordinance contained an
implicit requirement that the City must give notice to the neighbors of a
117
planner's determination.
Discovery filed a writ of certiorari to appeal the ZBA's determination.
In that case, Discovery perfected service on the City, the defendant-incertiorari, but did not serve the ZBA, the respondent-in-certiorari. After
filing the original petition for writ of certiorari, Discovery voluntarily
dismissed the petition and refiled within six months thereafter.118 The
City then filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the refiled petition was
void ab initionl9 because the original and the renewed writ of certiorari
were never served on the ZBA pursuant to O.C.G.A § 5-4-6(b), 120 which
provides as follows:

113. 338 Ga. App. 135, 789 S.E.2d 386 (2016).
114. O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61(a) (2017).
115. Dunwoody, 338 Ga. App. at 135, 789 S.E.2d at 387-88.
116. Id. at 137-38, 789 S.E.2d at 389.
117. Id. at 139, 789 S.E.2d at 390. The Dunwoody zoning ordinance provided that
appeals from a city planner's decision must be made within thirty days. At the ZBA's
hearing, the neighbors argued that they were unaware of this provision and that this
provision would violate due process if the ZBA did not read a notice requirement into the
ordinance. Id. at 138-39, 789 S.E.2d at 390.
118. Id. at 135-36, 789 S.E.2d at 337.
119. In other words, invalid from the outset. Id.
120. O.C.G.A. § 5-4-6(b) (2017).
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The certiorari petition and writ shall be filed in the clerk's office within
a reasonable time after sanction by the superior court judge; and a
copy shall be served on the respondent, within five days after such
filing, by the sheriff or his deputy or by the petitioner or his attorney.
A copy of the petition and writ shall also be served on the opposite
party or his counsel or other legal representative, in person or by mail;
and service shall be shown by acknowledgment or by certificate of the
counsel or person perfecting the service. 121
This statutory provision has been construed to require personal service
on the respondent-in-certiorari, here, the ZBA.122
Upholding the trial court's ruling, the Georgia Court of Appeals held
that failure to perfect service of the petition and writ on the local
government entity or officer whose decision is under review (the
respondent-in-certiorari)is a mere irregularity curable by either a waiver
evidenced by the filing of the answer, or by the trial court's extension of
time to perfect service. 123 Therefore, since the error was curable, the
underlying decision was voidable, not void. 124 The trial court did not err
in denying the City's motion to dismiss. 125 On this point, however, the
Discovery opinion was distinguished by City of Sandy Springs Board of
2
Appeals v. Traton Homes, LLC.1 6
The trial court also held that ZBA erred in accepting the neighbors'
untimely appeal and in reading a notice requirement into the ordinance
that did not otherwise exist. 127 The court upheld the trial court on both
of these issues.128 The neighbors' appeal was clearly untimely under the

121. Id.
122. Dunwoody, 338 Ga. App. at 136 n.1, 789 S.E.2d at 388 n..
123. Id. at 136-37, 789 S.E.2d at 388 (quoting Bass v. City of Milledgeville, 121 Ga. 151,
153, 48 S.E. 919, 920 (1904)).
124. Id. at 137, 789 S.E.2d at 388.
125. Id. at 137, 789 S.E.2d at 388-89.
126. 341 Ga. App. 551, 801 S.E.2d 599 (2017). Four days after the end of the survey
period, and while this Article was being drafted, the Georgia Court of Appeals decided City
of Sandy Springs Board of Appeals v. Traton Homes, LLC, which distinguished Dunwoody
by holding that failure to serve the defendant-in-certiorari, in other words, the local
government, the City of Sandy Springs, is a curable defect, but it is not when the local
government, as the properly opposing party, is not a named party to the suit. Id. at 558,
801 S.E.2d at 605. Sandy Springs also clarified that, contrary to the treatment of the
petition and writ of certiorari in Dunwoody, "the petition for certiorari filed by the
dissatisfied party, the writ of certiorari issued by the superior court clerk, and the sanction
by the superior court judge are separate entities." Id. at 554, 801 S.E.2d at 603.
127. Dunwoody, 338 Ga. App. at 138, 789 S.E.2d at 389.
128. Id. at 140, 789 S.E.2d at 390.
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City's ordinance. 129 Additionally, the neighbors were not entitled to
notice because due process, which "includes the right to notice and an
opportunity to be heard," extends only to proceedings "at which a party
may be deprived of life, liberty, or property."1 30 As a result, the court
summarily declared that "[d]ue process rights were not triggered" here;
"a use by right [is] not something that requires notification."13 1 However,
the court noted that the neighbors could obtain declaratory or injunctive
relief against Discovery if it were to continue to use its property in
contravention of the City's zoning ordinance.132
The trial court also reversed the ZBA decision that concluded the
initial classification by the City's planner was erroneous.133 Thus, the
trial court reinstated the "family personal care home" classification.134
Also on appeal, the City alleged the trial court erred in denying its motion
to dismiss Discovery's renewed writ of certiorari filed pursuant to
O.C.G.A. §§ 5-4-3 and 9-2-61(a).135 Section 9-2-61(a) of the O.C.G.A. (the
"renewal provision") provides as follows:
When any case has been commenced in either a state or federal court
within the applicable statute of limitations and the plaintiff
discontinues or dismisses the same, it may be recommenced in a court
of this state or in a federal court either within the original applicable
period of limitations or within six months after the discontinuance or
dismissal, whichever is later, subject to the requirement of payment of
costs in the original action as required by subsection (d) of OCGA § 911-41;136 provided, however, if the dismissal or discontinuance occurs
after the expiration of the applicable period of limitation, this privilege
of renewal shall be exercised only once. 13 7

129. Under Cumming, does the local-ordinance requirement, which specifies a time for
bringing a challenge, still apply since O.C.G.A. § 5-4-6 specifies a deadline for filing a writ
of certiorari?
130. Dunwoody, 338 Ga. App. at 139-40, 789 S.E.2d at 390.
131. Id. at 140, 789 S.E.2d at 390-91 (quoting the city planner at one of the ZBA
hearings).
132. Id. at 140-41, 789 S.E.2d at 391.
133. Id. at 135, 789 S.E.2d at 387.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-41(d) provides as follows: "[i]f a plaintiff who has dismissed an
action in any court commences an action based upon or including the same claim against
the same defendant, the plaintiff shall first pay the court costs of the action previously
dismissed." O.C.G.A. § 9-11-41(d) (2017).
137. O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61(a) (2017).
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Citing Buckler v. DeKalb County, 13 8 the court of appeals reiterated
that the renewal provision allows a case commenced within the statute
of limitation to be dismissed and recommenced within six months of
dismissal, even if the statute of limitations passes during the interim. 139
Nonetheless, the renewal provision does not apply to cases that were void
when dismissed or that were dismissed on the merits; it does, however,
apply if the case was merely voidable when dismissed. 140 Moreover, "'the
renewal provisions ... apply to [writ of] certiorari cases brought pursuant
to OCGA § 5-4-1 et seq."' 141 In light of Cumming and Dunwoody, appeals
of a quasi-judicial zoning decision by writ of certiorari are subject to the
renewal statute, but only if the case was not void when dismissed. 142
II. FACIAL CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE DOES NOT REQUIRE
EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES

In Elbert County v. Sweet City Landfill, LLC,143 the Georgia Supreme
Court reiterated that exhaustion of remedies is not required when an
ordinance is constitutionally challenged on its face. The court held that
O.C.G.A. 5-3-20 144--which requires an appeal to a superior court to "be
filed within 30 days of the date the judgment, order, or decision
complained of was entered"-did not apply to an Elbert County Board of
Commissioners vote. 145 Summarizing the Dormant Commerce Clause1 46
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of the United States, the court held
that the trial court erred in failing to apply the balancing test announced
in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. 147 to the "ordinance [that did] not, on its
face, discriminate against interstate commerce."1 48
Elbert County's Solid Waste Ordinance (the SW Ordinance), in effect
when the facts of the case arose, required a Special Use Permit for
operation of a solid waste landfill. Sweet City Landfill, LLC (Sweet City)
submitted an "Application" 14 9 that requested "a Special Use Permit and
138. 290 Ga. App. 190, 659 S.E.2d 398 (2008).
139. Dunwoody, 338 Ga. App. at 136, 789 S.E.2d at 387-88 (quoting Buckler, 290 Ga.
App. at 191, 659 S.E.2d at 399).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. See generally id.
143. 297 Ga. 429, 774 S.E.2d 658 (2015).
144. O.C.G.A. § 5-3-20 (2017).
145. Sweet City Landfill, 297 Ga. at 432, 434, 774 S.E.2d at 662, 664.
146. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
147. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
148. Sweet City Landfill, 297 Ga. at 435, 774 S.E.2d at 664.
149. Id. at 429, 774 S.E.2d at 661. The document was entitled "Application and Agreed
Minimum Operating Conditions." Id.
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a zoning estoppel letter and a certificate of solid waste plan consistency
be simultaneously issued."150 At the time Sweet City submitted its
Application, Elbert County (the County) was in the process of amending
the Ordinance to exempt "waste to energy" solid waste facilities 15 1 that
met the O.C.G.A. § 12-8-22(41)152 definition thereof.153 Sweet City
amended its Application to qualify as a waste to energy facility. After the
County approved a waste to energy landfill proposal from another
developer, Sweet City filed suit twice. In October 2011, the County and
Sweet City entered into a "tolling agreement" that placed the parties'
legal disputes in abeyance during negotiations related to the
Application. 154
Less than a month later, the County amended its ordinance to remove
the waste to energy exception. At Sweet City's request, the "discussion
and consideration [of] siting of a proposed solid waste facility and the
associated proposed host agreement" was placed on the next meeting
agenda of the Elbert County Board of Commissioners at which the Board
voted unanimously "not to enter into a 'Host Agreement' with [Sweet
City], and ... to terminate the tolling agreement."15 5 Over eight months
later, Sweet City filed a "Verified Complaint for Declaratory Judgment,
and Injunctive Relief' alleging, among other things, that the Ordinance
was unconstitutional. 15 6 The County moved to dismiss the complaint;
Sweet City moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted Sweet
City's motion for summary judgment and denied the County's motion to
dismiss.157

150. Id.
151. Id. The ordinance tied the definition of a "waste to energy facility" to that in
O.C.G.A. § 12-8-22(41) which provides that "'[w]aste to energy facility' means a solid waste
handling facility that provides for the extraction and utilization of energy from municipal
solid waste through a process of combustion." O.C.G.A. § 12-8-22(41) (2017).
152. O.C.G.A. § 12-8-22(41).
153. Sweet City Landfill, 297 Ga. at 430, 774 S.E.2d at 661..
154. Id.
155. Id. at 430, 774 S.E.2d at 661 (alteration in original).
156. Id. at 430-31, 774 S.E.2d at 661. Sweet City also alleged that it "had a vested right
to develop the subject property as a waste disposal facility" and "sought a mandatory
injunction allowing it to proceed with the landfill." Id.
157. Id. at 431, 774 S.E.2d at 661-62. In doing so, the trial court granted a temporary
injunction barring the County from enforcing or enacting any ordinances to interfere with
Sweet City's development and held the following: (1) the Ordinance violated the Commerce
Clause; (2) that the Board's action deprived Sweet City of equal protection under both the
Georgia and United States Constitutions; (3) Sweet City had a vested right to have a letter
of zoning and development consistency an compliance; and (4) Sweet City had a vested right
to develop the property as a landfill free of any zoning and land use restrictions. Id.
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The County appealed, contending first that Sweet City was required
to appeal within thirty days of the Board's vote pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 53-20.158 The court reasoned that the issue before the Board "was
essentially a framework of how a host agreement would be prepared,"
and the Board voted to refrain from pursuing that framework.159 At no
time did this framework refer to the Application. 160 Accordingly, the court
held that the Board took no action on Sweet City's Application, and the
Board's vote was not a "decision" within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 5-320.161 Irrespective of Elbert County, prudent practitioners should assume
that appeals from local government actions related to land use should be
taken within thirty days of the action pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 5-3-20,
particularly when claims other than a facial constitutional challenge are
available. 162
Next, the court addressed exhaustion of administrative remedieS 163
and held that the trial court erroneously rejected the County's argument
that this requirement mandated dismissal and, instead, applied the
futility exception. 16 4 However, the Board never voted on Sweet City's
Special Use Permit; therefore, Sweet City could not establish the crux of
the futility exception-that additional administrative review would
result in the same body rendering a decision on the same issue.1 6 5
Additionally, the trial court erroneously decided in favor of Sweet City on
the merits of its vested rights and equal protection claims (based on the
County's treatment of the other waste to energy landfill) because the
court only addressed vested rights claims after the local government has
refused to issue the necessary permits for a proposed project or has

158. Id. at 431, 774 S.E.2d at 662.
159. Id. at 432,.774 S.E.2d at 662.
160. Id.
161. Id. However, the court did hold that the trial court erred in asserting that Sweet
City was not required to appeal because the Board's vote occurred without public notice as
required by O.C.G.A. § 12-8-26(b) and the Elbert County Code of Ordinances. Id. A void
judgment does not make an appeal unnecessary, instead, "an appeal of a void judgment will
result in a reversal and provide redress from an illegal judgment." Sweet City Landfill, 297
Ga. at 432-33, 774 S.E.2d at 662-63.
162. See Sweet City Landfill, 297 Ga. at 432-33, 774 S.E.2d at 662-63.
163. "[T]he general rule [of exhaustion of remedies] is that before a party seeks redress
in the courts regarding the application of local regulation to property, it must apply to the
local authorities for determination of [the] matter." Id. at 433, 774 S.E.2d at 663 (quoting
City of Suwanee v. Settles Bridge Farm, LLC, 292 Ga. 434, 437, 738 S.E.2d 597, 599-600
(2013)).
164. Id. The futility exception is "narrow" and applies when "the litigant establishes
that submitting to the administrative process would be 'futile."' Id. (quoting Settles Bridge
Farm, LLC, 292 Ga. at 437, 738 S.E.2d at 600).
165. Id.
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imposed unconstitutional restrictions on an existing project.1 66 On
exhaustion of administrative remedies, the trial court also erred in
ordering Sweet City to return to the Board for a final "futile" decision. 167
The court reiterated that the exhaustion of administrative remedies
requirement does not apply when the constitutionality of an ordinance is
facially challenged. 168
Addressing Sweet City's constitutional claim that the Ordinance
violated the Dormant Commerce Clause, 169 the trial court also erred in
its analysis.1 70 The court reminded the bar that Supreme Court of the
United States precedent holds laws which discriminate on their face in
favor of in-state (as opposed.to out-of-state) economic interests, and that
are motivated by economic protectionism are per se invalid.' 7 ' However,
a facially non-discriminatory law must be analyzed under the balancing
test set forth in Pike, by which it172
will be upheld unless the burden [it] impose[s] on [interstate]
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.
If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one
of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will . .
depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it
could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate
activities.1 73
Because the trial court did not engage in the Pike balancing test, the
court remanded the case for the trial court to do so. 1 74

166. Id. (quoting Cooper v. Unified Gov't of Athens Clarke Cty., 277 Ga. 360, 362, 589
S.E.2d 105, 107 (2003)).
167. Id. at 434, 774 S.E.2d at 663-64.
168. Id. at 434, 774 S.E.2d at 663.
169. Id. at 434, 774 S.E.2d at 664. Specifically, Sweet City alleged, and produced
uncontroverted evidence, that when the Ordinance's requirements-that all such facilities
"be located on a State Highway, not create traffic through residential areas, be more than
three miles from 'state waters' . . . be more than three miles from certain cultural and
governmental sites, and be more than one mile from any residence or water supply well"were applied, no suitable site existed in the County and, therefore, the Ordinance violated
the Dormant Commerce Clause by hindering interstate commerce. Id.
170. Id. at 436, 774 S.E.2d at 664-65.
171. Id. at 435, 774 S.E.2d at 664 (quoting United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer
Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 338 (2007)).
172. Id. In other words, an ordinance that "regulates even-handedly to effectuate a
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental."

Id.
173. Id. (quoting Pike, 397 U.S. at 142).
174. Id. at 436, 774 S.E.2d at 665.
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III. A PERMISSIBLE ACCESSORY USE CAN TRANSFORM INTO AN
IMPERMISSIBLE PRINCIPAL USE

In Burton v. Glynn County,175 the Georgia Supreme Court held that a
permissible accessory use of property in a zoning district can become so
"sufficiently voluminous and mechanized" that it "move [s] beyond that
expected or customary for" the zoning classification as to become an
impermissible principal use, especially in single-family residential
zoning districts. 1 7 6 A zoning ordinance is not unconstitutionally vague
merely because it does not identify with mathematical precision the point
at which a permissible accessory use is transformed into an
impermissible principal use.177 To satisfy due process, an ordinance
"must 'be specific enough to give fair warning of the prohibited conduct"'
or, in other words, "sufficiently specific for 'persons of common
intelligence' to recognize that [a use] does not qualify as a permissible
use in" the zoning district. 178
In Burton, property owners built a "lavish home ...
known as Villas
de Suenos," in a "low-to-medium density residential" zoning district
located in the East Beach neighborhood of St. Simons Island. It was
offered as a short-term vacation rental, a permissible use under the
Glynn County Zoning Ordinance (the Ordinance). After neighbors
complained, the Glynn County Community Development Director (the
Director) concluded, upon investigating, that Villa de Suenos was being
utilized as a "commercial event venue," 179 a use that was not permitted
in the zoning district. The Director sent the owners of Villa de Suenos
(the Owners) a cease and desist letter. 180
The Owners then filed suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, a
writ of mandamus, and writ of prohibition to prevent enforcement of the
Ordinance. They also alleged that the enforcement of the Ordinance

175. 297 Ga. 544, 776 S.E.2d 179 (2015).
176. Id. at 547-48, 776 S.E.2d at 183 (quoting Cawthon v. Douglas Cty., 248 Ga. 760,
765, 286 S.E.2d 30, 34 (1982)).
177. Id. at 548, 776 S.E.2d at 183.
178. Id. at 548-49, 776 S.E.2d at 183 (quoting 105 Floyd Road, Inc. v. Crisp Cty., 279
Ga. 345, 348, 613 S.E.2d 632, 634 (2005)).
179. Id. at 544-45, 776 S.E.2d at 181.
[F]rom 2010 through May 2013, at least 79 events were held at the property, with
many exceeding 100 guests. In print and online media, Villa de Suenos was
described as "perfect for weddings" and touted as "St. Simon's Island's premier
wedding destination;" and its website featured scores of photographs of
weddings held at the property. Guests who booked Villa de Suenos were
furnished with a list of preferred caterers, photographers, florists, wedding
planners, and other similar vendors.
Id. at 544, 776 S.E.2d at 181.
180. Id. at 545, 776 S.E.2d at 181.
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violated their constitutional rights to due process and equal protection. 181
After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the Owners'
constitutional claims, upheld the County's interpretation of the
ordinance and compelled the owners of Villa de Suenos to comply with
the ordinance, as interpreted by the County. 182 Specifically, the trial
court held:
The Burtons' permissible accessory use of their property to host a
wedding or social event has become the primary use of their property,
and the magnitude, frequency, and cumulative impact thereof has
moved beyond that expected or customary for a one-family dwelling.
Because this use falls outside the normal scope of residential property
use, it is thus violative of the [Ordinance]. 183
When the Owners did not cease using the property as an event center,
the County filed a motion for contempt. The trial court denied that
motion. The County appealed; the Owners cross-appealed. 184
The supreme court's analysis began by reciting the above quote from
the trial court's order and declaring that: "[i]n the construction of an
ordinance, 'the cardinal rule is to ascertain and give effect to the
intention of the lawmaking body."'185 The express purpose, under the
ordinance, of the zoning district where Villa de Suenos sits is to preserve
and prevent any other uses from "adversely affecting the single-family
residential character of the district."186 Accordingly, the Ordinance
limited the use of property in the district generally to "[o]ne-family
dwelling[s]" and "[a]ccessory uses." 187 The court, as a result, concluded
that the ordinance's clear intent was to restrict the use of properties in
the district to residential uses and others customarily incidental
thereto.1 88 Use of Villa de Suenos as an event center on an average of
twenty-five times a year caused the incidental, accessory use of the Villa
as an event center to become one that 'sufficiently voluminous and

181. Id. The County counterclaimed seeking injunctive and declaratory relief tracking
its interpretation of the Ordinance. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 546, 776 S.E.2d at 182.
184. Id. The Owners' cross-appeal argued the trial court's second order was erroneous
to the extent it reaffirmed the previous order. Id.
185. Id. (quoting Ervin Co. v. Brown, 228 Ga. 14, 15, 183 S.E.2d 743, 745 (1971)).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 547, 776 S.E.2d at 182.
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mechanized"' to be outside the scope of permissible uses in the district
under the ordinance.18 9
Affirming the trial court's implicit rejection of the Owner's due process
vagueness challenge, the court concluded that the ordinance "is
sufficiently specific for 'persons of common intelligence' to recognize that
the [Owners'] . .. use of Villa de Suenos does not qualify as a permissible
use in" the zoning district. 190 The court also affirmed the trial court's
decision to not grant an injunction, based on the applicable abuse of
discretion standard.191 The court held that the trial court's first orderreviewing and affirming the interpretation of the ordinance-constituted
a declaratory judgment (not an injunction) and, therefore, under
O.C.G.A. § 5-6-46,192 the Owner's appeal thereof operated as supersedeas
to prevent enforcement of the first order and to strip the trial court of
jurisdiction to hear the County's motion for contempt. 193 In doing so, the
court noted that "an order simply delineating what the applicable legal
authority requires or prohibits is a declaratory judgment. Such an order
is not converted into an injunction merely because it directs a party to
comply with the law so construed." 194 In other words, the Owners were
always in violation of the ordinance, the trial court's first order merely
specified the boundaries of compliance and non-compliance. 195
Accordingly, the first order was a declaratory judgment. Therefore, the
trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear the motion for contempt and should
have either denied it or held it in abeyance during the pendency of the
appeal.196

189. Id. at 548, 776 S.E.2d at 182-83 (quoting Cawthon, 248 Ga. at 765, 286 S.E.2d at
34). 'The frequency of the events and the apparently systematic manner in which the
property [was] marketed and utilized for large-scale gatherings support the conclusion that
the property's use as an event venue . . . as the trial court found, 'moved beyond that
expected or customary for a one-family dwelling."' Id. (quoting Cawthon, 248 Ga. at 765,
286 S.E.2d at 34).
190. Id. at 549, 776 S.E.2d at 183 (quoting 105 Floyd Road, Inc., 279 Ga. at 348, 613
S.E.2d at 634).
191. Id. at 550-51, 776 S.E.2d at 185.
192. O.C.G.A. § 5-6-46 (2017).
193. Burton, 297 Ga. at 549-50, 776 S.E.2d at 184. "A declaratory judgment is 'a means
by which a superior court 'simply declares the rights of the parties or express (its)
opinion . . . on a question of law, without ordering anything to be done."' Id. at 549, 776
S.E.2d at 184 (quoting Baker v. City of Marietta, 271 Ga. 210, 213, 518 S.E.2d 879, 883
(1999)). "An injunction, by contrast, imposes an affirmative duty on the party enjoined to
either perform--or refrain from performing-a specified act." Id. at 550, 776 S.E.2d at 184.
194. Id. at 550, 776 S.E.2d at 184.
195. Id.
196. Id.
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IV. CONSENT ORDER LANGUAGE CONTROLS

The City of Dunwoody (the City) was a party in another significant
case during the survey period. In Olympus Media, LLC v. City of
Dunwoody,197 Action Outdoor Advertising JV, LLC (Action) obtained
permits in 2001 from DeKalb County (the County) to erect a billboard of
certain dimensions.19 8 Action, however, built a bigger billboard than
permitted, 19 9 though both sizes violated the County's current ordinance.
The County revoked Action's sign permit because the permitted and
constructed sign exceeded that allowed by the County's ordinance. Action
appealed; the trial court upheld the County's revocation finding that
Action did not have a vested right in the revoked permit because, from
its inception, the permit violated the County's ordinance. 200 That decision
remains undisturbed. 201
Instead of removing the sign, Action negotiated with the County to
preserve its sign and resolve disputes concerning other proposed and
existing billboards. During the negotiations, a new entity leased the sign
and made physical changes to the billboard that increased its overall size.
The trial court subsequently entered a consent order that finalized the
legal status of all the unresolved billboards, including the billboard at
issue here. That order "allow[ed] Action to retain certain signs 'as
presently constructed."' 202 Later the same year, Action was granted
permits for the billboard at issue from both the Georgia Department of
Transportation and the County that allowed the billboard "to be an
indirectly illuminated, electronic, multi-message sign." 203 Rather than
building the sign for which it had a permit, Action reconstructed the
billboard so that it could accommodate a full-face digital LED billboard.
Reconstruction involved deconstructing the existing sign and pole
support, erecting a stronger pole, and installing new electrical wiring.
After construction was completed, Action reinstalled the advertising sign
that existed at the time of the consent order. 204

197. 335 Ga. App. 62, 780 S.E.2d 108 (2015).
198. Id. at 63, 780 S.E.2d at 109. The permit allowed for a 10 feet by 50 feet billboard.
Id.
199. Id. The billboard was 14 feet by 48 feet. Id. The billboard at issue is located at 4368
N. Peachtree Road, which is currently in the City of Dunwoody. Id. at 63 n.3, 780 S.E.2d at
109 n.3. The billboard sits at the northwest corner of the Cotillion Drive and N. Peachtree
Road intersection which is just north of the northeastern most part of Interstate 285. Id.
200. Id. at 63, 780 S.E.2d at 109.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 64, 780 S.E.2d at 110.
203. Id.
204. Id.
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In December of the same year, the City was incorporated, and it
adopted zoning ordinances and sign regulations. Roughly twenty months
later, Action obtained a permit to install the necessary electrical
equipment, and it installed a full-face digital LED sign on the billboard
at issue. Action sold the billboard to Olympus Media, LLC (Olympus)
later the same month. The next month, the City adopted a new sign
ordinance, which it amended less than a year later. Based on its new sign
ordinance (as amended), the City issued Olympus a citation for the sign.
Before the citation was resolved at the city level, Olympus sued the City
seeking declaratory relief. The trial court held that the current version of
the sign was not authorized by and violated the consent order. Olympus
only had a vested right to the sign as it existed at the time of the consent
order. The trial court further held that Olympus did not have standing
to challenge the City's sign ordinance because it had not applied for and
been denied a permit. Both the City and Olympus appealed. 205
On appeal, the Georgia Court of Appeals, quoting in bulk Corliss
Capital, Inc. v. Dally,206 reminded the litigants that a consent order is
essentially a binding agreement of the parties that is sanctioned by a
court. 207 It is subject to the rules governing the interpretation and

enforcement of contracts, 208 and it can be construed according to the
general rules of contract construction. 209 The court stated that Olympus's
argument ignored the basic tenants of contract law and held that the trial
court did not err in concluding that the consent order did not authorize
the conversion of the billboard at issue "to a full-face digital LED sign." 210

On appeal, Olympus also argued that the billboard should remain
because the City lacked standing, and its sign ordinance, as amended,
was invalid. The trial court determined that it did not need to analyze
the claims because the billboard at issue violated the terms of the consent
order as it existed at the time. Instead, the court held that a permit, such
as the one issued to Olympus to permit "a full-face digital LED sign" in
violation of the ordinance issued for "an illegal use or an illegal
nonconforming use is void."21 1 It cannot be utilized as an excuse to
continue the illegal use because an illegal permit does not cause

205. Id. at 64-66, 780 S.E.2d at 110-11.
206. 268 Ga. App. 594, 602 S.E.2d 304 (2004).
207. Olympus Media, 335 Ga. at 66, 780 S.E.2d at 111.
208. Id. (quotingCorliss Capital, 268 Ga. App. at 595, 602 S.E.2d at 305).
209. Id. "Furthermore . . . where the language of a contact is plain and unambiguous,
no construction is required or permissible and the terms of the contract must be given an
interpretation of ordinary significance." Id.
210. Id. at 67-68, 780 S.E.2d at 112.
211. Id. at 68, 780 S.E.2d at 112.
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constitutional rights to vest. 212 Therefore, Olympus could not use those

permits to argue that the billboard, as it existed then, could remain. 2 13
Olympus's right to have the billboard was limited to that vested at the
time of the consent order. 214 Olympus's challenge to the City's sign
ordinance as applied to the billboard at issue was, therefore, moot. 2 15
Additionally, the court rejected the City's argument that Olympus
abandoned any vested right it had in the billboard when it "dismantl[ed]
the billboard and upgrad[ed] it to accommodate a full-face LED sign." 2 16
The City argued that Olympus's dismantling of the billboard was akin to
abandoning an easement. The court found this unpersuasive because
"[n]othing in the act of upgrading the disputed billboard evinces an intent
to cease using the billboard." 217 Consequently, the trial court properly
found that Action did not abandon its rights in the billboard. 218

212. Id. (quoting Corey Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Bd. of Zoning Adjustments, 254 Ga.
221, 225-26, 327 S.E.2d 178, 183 (1985)).
A permit issued for a use or structure which is forbidden by the ordinance is
beyond the power of the officer to issue; consequently, it has no legal status, is
invalid, and is itself entirely without power to clothe its holder with any legal
rights thereunder. A permit for a use prohibited by a valid zoning ordinance,
regulation, or restriction is void, of no effect, and subject to revocation. This is
true although the permit has been issued under a mistake offact. The expenditure
of even substantial sums in reliance upon a permit found to be void is generally
held not to raise an estoppel against its revocation or against enforcement of the
ordinance found to be violated by the use or structures maintained pursuant to
the permit.
Corey Outdoor Advertising, 254 Ga. at 225-26, 327 S.E.2d at 183.
213. Olympus Media, 335 Ga. at 68, 780 S.E.2d at 113.
214. Id. at 69, 780 S.E.2d at 113.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 69-70, 780 S.E.2d at 113.
217. Id. at 70, 780 S.E.2d at 113.
218. Id. at 70, 780 S.E.2d at 114.
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